spired by political motives. It means that our opinions, whether we agree or not, must be inspired by what Lincoln in his first inaugural address called "the better angels of our nature."

When we see the kind of administration which the President is giving this country—its enlightenment, its generosity, its fundamental decency, and its effectiveness in behalf of our people in our domestic affairs; when we consider its skill, its prudence, and its vision in leading us in the dreadful struggle brought on by world communism, it is natural for us to exclaim that we would like to see Dwight D. Eisenhower as our President without any limit as to time. I predict that the people will not allow him to retire and will surely insist on his serving for another 4 years. In bringing about peace and at the same time preserving prosperity, he has already done what many thought was impossible. The American people know when they have something good, and they have that something good in Dwight Eisenhower.

Just as Lincoln, whose name we revere tonight, was the right man for the tragic crisis of the Civil War, so is President Eisenhower the man to lead us in this perilous struggle with world communism.

The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. MIKE MANSFIELD

OF MONTANA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, February 21, 1955

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a speech which I delivered at the commissioning exercises of the 12th officer candidate class, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, Va., on February 19, 1955. The address is entitled "The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy."

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

(Address of Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana)

An elected official can hardly expect universal approval of his position on every issue. Almost invariably some people will agree with him and others will disagree, sometimes very vehemently. And I must say that a Member of Congress pricked by public criticism bleeds at least as profusely as any other human being.

In a decade and a half of service in Congress, I have been on sick call for this reason on a number of occasions. I have learned to accept occasional wounds as a part of my job, as an occupational hazard.

There is one issue, however, which I have repeatedly tackled in Congress and have repeatedly come out, not licking my wounds but miraculously unscathed. That issue is the preservation of the integrity of the Marine Corps.

While Members of Congress must out of conviction sometimes run counter to the immediate flow of public opinion, it is not a very pleasant experience. It is always preferable, if you can do so honestly, to find yourself flowing downstream with public sentiment rather than struggling upstream, half-drowned, against it.

Beyond the natural gratification which comes to an elected official when he finds his own heart and the public pulse beating in perfect unison—beyond that, I have a special pleasure in fighting for the integrity of the corps. As a marine, I take personal pride in the marines. Of course, I also take personal pride in the Army and the Navy, as an ex-member of each of those services. But I think I may be pardoned if I tend to be a little prouder of my marine background. I was only a private in the Army. I was only a seaman, second class, in the Navy. But with that same perceptiveness which prompted the Marine Corps to recognize your qualities of leadership the corps also recognized mine. I emerged from my hitch in the Marines as a Pfc.

That distinction, I realize, does not, in itself, qualify me to speak to you on the Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, I feel that the subject is of such great importance that it should be considered not only by privates—buck or first class—and Senators, but by thoughtful Americans throughout the Nation. I think it is an especially pertinent one for you men who are graduating today into command positions in the corps. The Marines have traditionally operated with high effectiveness as a principal military instrument of this Nation's foreign policy during peacetime just as they have more than once proved their tremendous capabilities when the peace has been violated.

One explanation for this outstanding service may well be that the corps has always maintained a strict professional regard for the American principle of civilian control of military power. That principle, as I am sure you have been taught, is absolutely essential for the proper functioning of our system of government. It is not enough that Congress determines appropriations and organizational arrangements, and that the President and his civilian assistants direct the administrative management of the military. The American concept goes further. It requires that the military shall only be used whenever, wherever, and in whatever manner the politically responsible civilian leadership shall determine, because only that leadership, through elections, can be held accountable to the people of the Nation.

In the present state of world affairs, a system of civilian control is not easily maintained. It is subject to all the stresses and strains that arise from the tense international situation. In a crisis, with the threat of world conflict ever present, it is not unnatural to turn to distinguished military leaders for guidance, to rely heavily on their judgment, and sometimes it is profitable to the nation to do so. Nevertheless, the principle of civilian control remains essential to democratic government as we know it.

Primary responsibility for the preservation of this principle rests with our civilian leadership; that leadership must be willing to assume the heavy responsibilities of decision in this dangerous world. But I think you will agree that considerable responsibility also rests with the military. They must understand and accept the limits as well as the challenges of their profession in the conduct of the Nation's affairs, particularly its foreign affairs.

Perhaps I can illustrate this point with an anecdote. During the Civil War, the story goes, certain Members of Congress left their desks in Washington and went to the battlefields in Virginia. There they insisted upon assuming the tactical command of the Union forces. After having thrown the campaign into confusion they beat a hasty retreat to Washington where they arrived mud-spattered, trembling, and presumably chastised.

If the story is amusing, it is because it is easy to recognize the absurdity of this escapade. These Congressmen apparently assumed that their training in politics equipped them to run the Army. They also distorted and distended the functions of their office out of all true proportion.

The moral of the story is simple enough: Congressmen ought not to assume that political training provides an automatic background for military leadership and, in military affairs, their role ought not to exceed the constitutional powers of their office.

Let us put the shoe on the other foot. The moral is now this: Military leaders ought not to assume that military training provides an automatic background for politics, whether national or international, and they ought not in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy exceed the powers of their appointive office.

Just as the distorted behavior of the Congressmen in the Civil War could have produced tragic results as easily as humorous, so too can the distorted behavior of military leaders.

It has never been easy to draw a clear line as to the area of competence and authority of the armed services in foreign policy. Events of the past 15 years have made it even more difficult. First of all, during this period, some among us, civilian and military alike, have developed a distorted sense of the nature of what this country is trying to do in its relations with other nations and how it can most effectively go about doing it. Foreign policy is simply the course by which we attempt to provide for the safety of the Nation and the advancement of its interests in a complex and dangerous world. That is its only reason for being. To carry out our policy we require military strength but we must also bring into play nonmilitary instruments and measures to influence conditions throughout the world. Possibly it is because these nonmilitary measures are less dramatic, less newsworthy, and tend to affect us and our families less directly, that we sometimes lose our perspective and regard them as less important than military actions. Sometimes there is a tendency to view nonmilitary measures merely as supplements of our military policy, when in fact the reverse is closer to the truth.

You men need hardly to be reminded of this fact. If you know the history of the corps, you know that the marines have been sent to foreign territories and to overseas bases only from time to time and only after the failure of other methods to protect American citizens and interests. In countless day-to-day situations arising in our foreign relations throughout the world the military instruments is in no way involved.

As for any large scale use of force, it is only when nonmilitary measures fail to produce situations favorable to the vital security interests of the United States, that such use may become necessary. Even then we have invoked military force only in response to aggression. That we have waited for our enemy to show beyond all shadow of doubt that he intends to strike us, rather than strike the first blow ourselves, does not mean that we are slow-witted or even patient. It means simply that we are following a fundamental American principle: that force is the final, not the first arbiter in the affairs of men and nations. Nothing has done more to toughen the moral fiber of this country than that principle. No other single factor has served to sustain our morale during the long and gruelling wars which we have had to fight. Nothing has done more to turn the hearts and hopes of mankind to this Nation. And I hope the day never comes when this Nation shall use its might in any way other than for protection against the arrogant, the aggressive, and the ruthless.

The role of the military in foreign policy, then, is to provide a reserve of power to support negotiations concerning our just interests in the world and to defend those interests if they are attacked. I want to under-

line the words "reserve and support." Responsibility for determining what our interests are and when and how they are to be defended is vested in the President and his Secretary of State. The Department of Defense and other agencies of the Government, in the performance of their duties have an influence in this determination, but final responsibility cannot rest in any body other than the Department of State or the President himself.

Since the beginning of World War II, however, the role of the military in American foreign policy has assumed proportions of great magnitude. During the war the armed services inevitably became the foremost element in carrying our American policy. Since the close of those hostilities the services have continued to serve prominently in this connection, due to the nature of postwar diplomacy and developments.

The occupation of Germany and Japan, and the control of trust territories, among other things, has brought the armed services directly into foreign policy to a degree unprecedented in peacetime. To some extent, the same was true of the so-called Truman doctrine of 1947. Under the Truman Doctrine, the Armed Forces not only ran military training missions to strengthen the security of Greece and Turkey against Communist aggression, but of necessity played a significant role in the formulation of policy with respect to those countries. Subsequently, they have had an enormous influence in foreign policy in connection with NATO, mutual aid and military assistance missions in numerous countries, the Korean war, overseas bases, and treaties with nations in the western Pacific.

I think that one of the chief problems emanating from this chain of developments is that in many instances there has been a tendency to treat individual military programs and policies as separate and distinct military affairs, whereas they actually are parts of the totality of American foreign policy. Responsibility for decision making has at times been vested in military officials rather than in foreign-policy officials. In other instances there has been a failure to define and clarify lines of responsibility for policy formulation. I say this, not so much in criticism as in recognition of the fact. It is unlikely that anyone planned it that way; it has simply happened—perhaps largely because it was not planned.

The obscuring of the lines of responsibility and authority is perhaps best illustrated in the issuance of public statements by leaders of the armed services. Such statements are usually expressed in military terminology. Often, however, much of their substance is of a foreign-policy nature. Perhaps this is unavoidable in view of the complexity of the matters with which they frequently deal. One cannot always draw a clear-cut line between military and political and other factors in a given situation.

The question of rearming Germany will serve to illustrate this point, and this example finds a counterpart in practically every other major foreign policy issue with which we are confronted. There are strong military reasons for urging the rearmament of Germany and it is natural for military personnel to see the need in terms of added divisions of manpower, bases, etc. But Germany cannot be rearmed in a vacuum. Rearmament cannot be divorced from a whole range of problems concerning European unity, the fears of France, the role of Britain on the Continent, the reunification of Germany, and the maintenance of the western alliance. It seems to me, therefore, that official statements on this subject under our system of government emanate best from our foreign policy officials. They are presumably kept well informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the military considerations involved and they in turn are best equipped to view such considerations and to express them publicly in terms of the totality of American interests.

I cite this example merely to illustrate the problem of defining the role of the military in American foreign policy. It is not difficult to see the principal reason for the expansion of military participation in foreign policymaking. As I mentioned earlier, the nature of wartime and postwar developments and diplomacy has required a vastly increased use of the military as an instrument of policy.

There is, however, still another factor. The military emerged from the war with great prestige, both at home and abroad, and this prestige has carried over into the postwar period. On the international scene this has led to widespread use of prominent military leaders in diplomatic capacities. At various periods since the close of World War II three of our foremost military leaders during the war have served in positions which were more political than military and which roughly corresponded to their wartime military roles—General Eisenhower as NATO commander, General MacArthur in charge of the occupation of Japan, and General Marshall as Secretary of State. Each of these distinguished military leaders had earned the respect of foreign nations, as well as the American people, through their outstanding military service. Each made an exceptional contribution in their postwar assignments.

Other military leaders have also been called upon for diplomatic or political services—Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Under Secretary of State, and Adm. Alan Kirk, who served as Ambassador to Belgium and Ambassador to the Soviet Union, are two leading examples. I could name two dozen other former generals and admirals now holding civilian positions in the Federal Government. Countless others of field grade are scattered through the civilian bureaucracies of the Federal Government concerned with foreign affairs and international organizations.

This increased use of military leaders in position of a diplomatic or political nature, of course, has often been due not only to carryover of the military prestige of these men but also to their demonstrated ability as well as their availability for such service.

Without in any way reflecting on the capacity of any individual, I do think that the vast expansion in the employment of military personnel in both the making and carrying out of foreign policy is something to which we should give some serious thought. It raises questions not only with respect to our basic values but also with respect to our basic foreign-policy objectives, including our military security.

First, let me say something about the question which I think this trend poses concerning our basic values.

Military officers are not different from anyone else in this country. They come from representative families all over the Nation; they go to the same grade schools and high schools; they hold the same social and religious values. But the military profession exacts from those who pursue it a higher measure of self-sacrifice in the public interest than most other professions. The military as a group must accept a higher degree of training, conditioning, and disciplining toward one objective—to provide military protection for the Nation. That is as it should be and those who enter the profession, like you men today, understand these conditions.

Like any other professional group the military in their dedication to their primary objective may tend to lose sight of other national objectives. It appears to me, consequently, that when the military in fact make policy decisions or when military techniques are excessively applied to carry out policies which can be more appropriately handled by civilian techniques, we are in danger of having military objectives and values emphasized at the expense of other, broader national objectives and values.

With respect to our basic foreign policy objectives, including military security itself, the expansion of the military role in foreign policy poses some more immediate dangers. Responsibility for our entire foreign policy, which is concerned with international economc, cultural, and political relations, as well as with military affairs, is vested in our Secretary of State. Our military objectives have no meaning in themselves except as they tend to further our nonmilitary objectives. If they are given an independent meaning, if they become ends in themselves, we could easily be led into costly adventures which would only add to the financial and human burdens of the American people and which might ultimately result in widespread public reaction against the military. The best way to avoid a distorted emphasis on military objectives, the way that is provided under our constitutional system, is to require that final authority in foreign policy decision making remain unequivocally with the Secretary of State under the President of the United States.

In terms of our military security specifically, as distinguished from the wider range of foreign policy, it appears to me that a further danger exists. Our military experts may weaken their professional stature through overanxious acceptance of an increased role in policy matters.

In recent years military leaders have been brought into the limelight of public discussions of foreign policy largely as a result of their well-earned public prestige. Civilian political leaders have tended to rely heavily on this prestige gained through military accomplishments in order to support policies affecting our foreign policy. Generals and admirals have been called upon or sent to testify regularly before congressional committees, not only in connection with military appropriations and matters affecting the individual services, but also in connection with broad issues of policy, such as economic assistance programs and international alliances. Military officials, moreover, frequently discuss political issues—not necessarily partisan political issues, but issues of a political nature—at public appearances and press conferences. I may say at this point that the Marine Corps has been singularly free of this type of affliction. To the best of my knowledge, the leadership of the corps has successfully resisted the temptation to assert its expertness verbally and publicly not only in military matters but over the whole range of human affairs. Only an elected official, constantly beckoned by the siren call of the press, radio, and television, can appreciate the extraordinary degree of self-control that this represents. It is one more reason for me to be proud of my personal connection with the corps.

Now what is the danger to our security inherent in the exposure of military leaders—whether sought or unsought—to the political conflicts of the day? It is this: Military leaders who are so exposed will find themselves in agreement with one side of a political issue and at odds with the other. They will be applauded by political leaders whose position they uphold and looked upon with suspicion by their opponents. When military officers become subjects of partisan politics they are no longer viewed as unbiased, objective career servants, nor will their military judgments be accepted as those of politically disinterested professional experts. From that, it is only one step to the loss of confidence in the military judgment of our military leaders.

This central problem was clearly illustrated prior to the last presidential election

when a Senator publicly called for a change in the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had, he said lost confidence in their judgment. The new administration, moreover, subsequently did appoint new Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a new look at the military program. Surely we cannot have Republican generals and admirals for one administration and Democratic generals and admirals for the next without danger to the national security.

Now, possibly as never before, we cannot afford to play politics with our security. No political party, and no faction of a party, stands in the long run to benefit from military insecurity in this country. Certainly, the armed services as a whole do not.

In mentioning this tendency of some military officers to slip into or to be drawn into the political orbit of our system of government, I do not wish to imply that the military experts should have no contact with Congress. Certainly Congress has a right to know what our military experts think about military matters under consideration in Congress. The danger lies, not in this, but in military officers being employed as experts outside the area of their special competence in support of or in opposition to policy matters concerning which political and not military decision must be made.

There is no easy solution to this problem. Part of the answer lies in the restraint which civilian leaders must exercise to avoid placing military officials on the spot in political issues. Part of the answer must also lie in the fortitude with which military leaders resist the temptation to project themselves into nonmilitary questions.

This problem may seem remote to you men now, but within a short span of years as your careers unfold it may well become for some of you a most pressing and difficult one.

As I mentioned earlier, responsibility for maintaining the proper civilian-military balance in our system of government must be shared by both our military leaders and our civilian political leadership. The military must exercise the utmost restraint in policy matters, and our civilian leadership must be willing to take full responsibility for political decisions.

In foreign relations we need constantly to keep in mind the essential relationship of military force to total foreign policy. Military leaders as well as civilian foreign-policy officials must understand the supporting role of military force. Military resources, like other tools of foreign policy, must be available to our politically-accountable civilian policymakers when, where, and under conditions prescribed by those policymakers. It is incumbent upon our policymakers that they should take full advantage of military advice; but when the time for decision-making comes, the civilian policymaker must make the choice and take full responsibility for that choice.

How can we preserve this principle and at the same time provide for our own military security? There are no hard and fast rules. There is only commonsense and a few guideposts appropriate to the present state of world affairs.

First, it is essential that we maintain the necessary military strength to meet the threat of Communist aggression.

At the same time, however, every effort should be made to use nonmilitary measures to conduct foreign policy wherever possible. They are less costly and often they can produce beneficial results that are more lasting in their effects. If we are to pursue them successfully, however, we must learn that every nonmilitary action in foreign policy is not an act of appeasement.

I would also suggest that if it becomes clear that we are tending away, rather than toward, a general war, we profit from long years of experience and place greater reliance on the Marine Corps as the military force to support our diplomacy in foreign policy. In saying this I am fully aware of the basic need for a multiservice fighting force in modern warfare. We share, I know, a great pride in the Marines and believe them capable of extraordinary feats. But we must admit that the corps has not yet rendered the Army, Navy, and Air Force obsolete.

Nevertheless, I still believe that the proper way to fight "brush fires" in various parts of the world is not with the forces trained for general warfare, but with the specially trained self-sustaining, combat-ready forces of the Marine Corps. No other military group is so well suited to immediate service in any part of the world. No other group is more competent to keep the expenditure of force close to the requirements for achieving limited objectives.

Finally, I want to say that the most important element in the preservation of the principle of civilian control of American foreign policy is to require that our civilian foreign-policy officials take full responsibility for decisions affecting foreign policy.

Your share in maintaining the proper role of the military in foreign policy is, it seems to me, to keep in mind that every action you take in your official capacities has a bearing on the foreign relations of the Nation. You will either contribute to the safety and well-being of the United States or you will detract from it; you cannot be neutral. And if you would contribute to it, as I know you wish to do, then you will maintain always a high sense of patriotic and professional responsibility in the fulfillment of your duties. You will find your personal satisfactions in your profession by understanding your part in the perspective of the corps, in the larger perspective of the armed services, and in the perspective of the total interests of our country.

The Decade Since Yalta

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, February 21, 1955

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an address I delivered before the Western States Meat Packers Association in San Francisco on Friday last, February 18, 1955.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY SENATOR WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND BEFORE THE WESTERN STATES MEAT PACKERS ASSOCIATION, SAN FRANCISCO, FEBRUARY 18, 1955

THE DECADE SINCE YALTA

Mr. Chairman, fellow Americans, 10 years ago 2 conferences of far-reaching significance took place. The first was Yalta held from February 4 to 11, 1945. Its locale was the Crimean Peninsula within the Soviet Union.

Three great powers were represented. These were the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

The second one was the United Nations Conference held in San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. At that time 50 nations signed the charter and since then 10 additional nations have done so bringing the total membership to 60.

In that same 10-year period of time to which I have referred, international communism has increased its power, its area and its population. Ten years ago at this time there were less than 200 million people behind the Communist Iron Curtain. Today over 800 million people live under the most ruthless, godless tyranny the world has ever known.

The world balance of power has been so upset that no prudent person can ignore the realities of the situation. Not only the future of this Republic but the hope for a free world of free men largely depends upon the policies that we follow and the firmness with which we and the free nations deal with future Communist aggression or threat of aggression.

Recognizing the inherent danger in further Communist conquest, the Government of the United States has undertaken a series of commitments under the North Atlantic Alliance, the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) mutual-defense pact and mutual-defense pacts with the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Japan, southeast Asia, and the Republic of China.

The last two treaties were overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate this month.

The Manila pact covering southeast Asia was ratified on Tuesday, February 1, by a vote of 82 to 1, and the one with the Republic of China on Wednesday, February 9, by a vote of 64 to 6. These two ratifications were preceded by congressional action in support of the joint resolution recommended by the President authorizing him to use the Armed Forces of the United States in defense of Formosa, the Pescadores, and additional areas now in friendly hands that might be deemed important for the proper defense of the main bastion of Formosa.

In a display of national unity that should have encouraged our friends abroad, given courage to the neutrals and opened the eyes of the would-be aggressor, the House of Representatives passed the resolution by a vote of 409 to 3 and the Senate by a vote of 85 to 3.

This action had no sooner been taken and the two treaties ratified than diplomatic moves started on the part of certain Asian and European powers to bend the line of defense in the Pacific and lay the groundwork for a conference which would have all the unfortunate results of a Munich, a Yalta or a Geneva wherein the aggressor gains his objectives at the conference table.

Unfortunately, the history of these conferences has been that it is always the free world that gives up territory and surrenders human beings to the control of the Communists. It is never the other way around wherein the enslaved people gain their freedom.

It becomes pertinent, therefore, to examine the various proposals that have been made and what there implications are.

In order to deal with these matters, however, let us first examine the Yalta conference and the significance it had in the events which followed.

At Yalta without the knowledge or consent of the American people or the American Congress, an agreement was entered into which on its face violated the Atlantic Charter declaration and was fatally damaging to our friend and ally, the Republic of China.

Years later, in testimony, Alger Hiss, who had been one of the members of the American delegation stated:

"It is an accurate and not immodest statement to say that I helped formulate the Yalta agreement to some extent."

1. The agreement undercut the free Polish Government in exile and resulted in solidifying the power of the Lublin Communist Polish Government.

2. It carved out of Poland a slice of territory and gave the blessing of Great Britain